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GUARANTY-NECESSITY OF COMPLYING STRICTLY WITH TERMS OF
GUARANTY-DIRECTED VERDICT-Wilcoxson et al. vs. McMullin-No. 13802-Decided December 14, 1936-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
McMullin sold his interest in the Bank of De Beque and as part
of the sale, guaranteed in writing the full payment of the notes of one
Henderson and Clark within one year, provided that the bank would
use every effort to collect the amount due, and on the further condition
that his guarantee be not divulged. The bank made no effort to collect,
nor did it even try to get security for the notes when security was available. The court below gave an instructed verdict for defendant, McMullin.
1. The guaranty was based upon three conditions: First, that
the bank use every effort to collect; second, that the guarantee be not
divulged; third, that these conditions be kept until January 5, 1932,
and the notes remained unpaid.
2. McMullin's liability as guarantor must be strictly construed.
It cannot be extended.
3.
Diligence required obtaining payment or security covering all
or any portion of the debt reasonably possible.
4. The conditions of this guaranty were never met and were expressly repudiated and a directed verdict was proper.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.

ESCHEAT-NECESSITY OF ORDER OF COUNTY COURT TO PAY FUNDS
TO STATE TREASURER-DEMURRER FOR WANT OF FACTSThe People vs. Cartwrightet al.-No. 13840-Decided December
14, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Cartwright, as administrator of an estate, gave bond as such, with
a surety company as his surety. When the estate was closed the heirs
were unknown and a decree so finding was entered, but there was no
order of the county court directing such administrator to pay over the
balance on hand to the State Treasurer under the escheat law. The
Attorney General in the name of the people brought suit for this balance. The complaint failed to allege that any order had been made by
the county c'ourt to pay over the balance to the State Treasurer. Demurrer to the complaint was sustained below.
1. In the absence of an order of the county court to pay such
balance to the State Treasurer, no duty rests upon an administrator to
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make payment under the escheat law, where the heirs are unknown, and
a complaint against such administrator and his surety which fails to
allege the entry of such an order and the failure to comply therewith
is fatally defective.
2. Where a demurrer is grounded upon the alleged fact that
there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, it is proper to overrule same where it appears that neither the
parties are the same nor the cause of action the same.--Judgment af-

firmed.

GUARANTY-LACK OF CONSIDERATION-GUARANTY MADE PURSUANT TO ORAL AGREEMENT-INSUFFICIENCY OF ASSIGNMENT

OF ERROR-The Newton Lumber Company us. Oberto-No.
13780-Decided December 14, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
The Newton Lumber Company sued Oberto and the Wilson
Lumber and Mercantile Company to recover $3,000 for lumber sold
the latter which it was claimed was guaranteed by Oberto. The guaranty was a written statement that if the Wilson Company did not pay
the Newton Company in monthly installments for the lumber already
sold and delivered, as it was resold, Oberto would. Oberto answered
denying consideration.
Judgment below went against the Wilson
Company and in favor of Oberto.
1. The written guarantee expresses no consideration upon its
face and appears to bc a mere offer. The only evidence of its acceptance
is that it was retained by the Newton Company. Apparently to cure
these defects the Newton Company was permitted to amend its reply to
allege that the guarantee was in confirmation of an oral guarantee made
at the time of the execution of the principal contract. Passing the contention that the oral guarantee, if made, was within the statute of
frauds, the writing becomes immaterial if there was no such oral guarantee. As to this, the evidence was in conflict and as against a general
judgment we must assume that the court found that it did not exist.
2. Assignments of error must specifically point out the alleged
error committed. A mere assignment that the judgment is contrary to
law or that the findings are contrary to law, when there are no findings
or that the court erred in entering judgment for Oberto for costs are
insufficient for the purpose of review.
3. The judgment being a general judgment based upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed.-Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY TO. ACCEPT MONEY OTHER THAN
STATUTORY FEE-SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION--Carr . vs.

The People-No. 13983-DecidedDecember 14, 193 6--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
Carr and O'Toole were tried jointly with one Leisenring on
charge of conspiracy to wilfully and corruptly take and receive the sum
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of $3,000, which was not a fee or compensation allowed in the enforcement of the liquor law. Carr, who was then Secretary of State and in
charge of the liquor law enforcement, was convicted and prosecutes error.
1. Where a defendant is acquitted on a count of an information
any error assigned is without avail, as he cannot complain.
2. Where the jury returned their verdict on a holiday and the
court advised the jury that it had not followed the instructions and
directed that it pursue further deliberations which resulted in a verdict
on a holiday, such proceedings by the court were not additional instructions, but were merely an exercise of the powers of the court connected
with the receiving of the verdict. Such act is ministerial. Verdicts can
be received on a holiday.
3.
There was no failure of proof. While the court failed to
instruct the jury that there was no direct evidence tending to prove
what fees were or were not allowed by law to the state licensing authority, yet the defendant failed to request such instruction, and it is now
claimed it was the duty of the court to give such instruction even without the request. No prejudice appears from the failure to give such
instruction. All the evidence shows that this money was paid to and
received by the defendants in their personal capacity and that the money
so extorted was a "fixing" which was a condition precedent before the
license would issue. There was no possible inference that the jury
could draw that this money was paid as a statutory fee for the issuance
of the license.
4. An information is sufficient which describes an offense either
in the language of the statute or so plainly that the nature of the crime
may be readily and easily understood by the jury.-Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -

AWARD-CHANGING

AWARD-NE-

CESSITY OF FINDINGS SUPPORTING SUCH CHANGED AWARD-

National Lumber & Creosoting Company et al. vs. Kelly et al.No. 13973-Decided December 14, 1936---Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Kelly was awarded compensation for an injury on the basis that
he was permanently disabled to the extent of 25% as a working unit.
This finding and order was made in 1931. In 1936, the commission
made a supplemental award, finding that the claimant was and now is
permanently and totally disabled and made an additional award based
thereon. A petition for rehearing was filed which was denied, and on
appeal to the District Court, the award was affirmed.
1. The award of the commission which was last'made, since it
changed and increased the former award, should have contained specific
findings, based upon the testimony as to a changed condition, as well as
specific findings as to error in the former findings.-Judgment reversed
with directions, and sent back to the commission for hearing and entry
of findings.
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DEMURRER-PEREMPTORY WRIT-HOME RULE -ORDINANCES
STATUTES-CHARGEABLE KNOWLEDGE OF CONSTITUTIONLEGISLATURE-GENERAL ASSEMBLY-AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES OF CONSTITUTION-RETROOPERATIVE LEGISLATION-City

of Colorado Springs us. State of Colorado, as Trustees of the Old
Age Pension Fund of El Paso County, Colorado-No. 13709District Court of El Paso County-Hon. John C. Young, Judge
-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Defendants in error as trustees brought mandamus to

compel the payment to them by the city of $4,000 collected for 50 beer
licenses. A general demurrer to the amended answer to the alternative
writ was sustained, and the writ made peremptory.
Colorado Springs, a "home rule" city, organized under Art. XX
of the State Constitution, passed an ordinance providing for the payment of 50% of all beer licenses collected, to be turned over to the Old
Age Pension Fund. The city brings error on the grounds that those
portions of sections 2 and 3 of chapter 144, page 748, L. 1933, under
which the defendant's claim, contravene section 6 of Art. XX and section 11 of Art. II of the State Constitution. Said section 11 forbids
the passage of retrooperative legislation. The city says that the disposition of the fees is governed by ordinance and not statute, because this
is a local and municipal matter, also that the sections of the ordinance
herein referred to are retrospective.
HELD: 1. These questions are disposed of by ameanded article
XXII of the Constitution, L. 1933, page 390, which was part of the
Constitution
when the ordinance was passed, and which provided that
"all intoxicating
liquors" became "exclusively" the subject of "statutory,
laws" from July 1, 1933.
2. If this chapter conflicts in any way with section 6 of Art.
XX or said section 11 of Art. II, those were, to that extent, amended
by it.
3. The legislature and the city are charged with knowledge of
the said Art. XXII of the Constitution and must be held to have acted
in the light thereof.
4. The regulation and sale qf intoxicating liquors passed under
the exclusive control of the legislature, and when it became effective, it
operated on all liquor license revenue still existing and undisposed of, as
were the funds here in question, and therefore under the full control of
the General Assembly. En Banc.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice Young not participating.
WATERS-IRRIGATION-FIXING

DATE OF PRIORITY-In the Matter

of the Adjudication of Prioritiesin District No. I-Klug vs. Ireland-No. 14044-Decided December 31, 1936-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
This was a statutory adjudication for-the settlement of priorities
to water for irrigation. The court below set Klug's priority for his
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reservoir No. 3 as of December 13, 1921. He contends that it should
be set as of July 18, 1918, because the evidence show's that he decided
to build it on July 6, 1918, and in pursuance thereof he made a survey
and filed his map and statement of claim on September 9, 1918, and in
1920 made a contract with Ireland, the then owner, for the purchase of
the land on which to build the reservoir, paying $100 down, but never
completed the contract of purchase. There was evidence that the actual
work of construction did not commence until late in the spring of 1922.
There was also evidence that Klug told Ireland to keep the $100 payment, as he did not intend to complete the deal.
1. There was ample evidence to sustain the date fixed by the trial
court under the well-recognized rule that diligence must be shown from
inception to completion.
2. What constitutes diligence depends upon the facts of each case.
3.
Trivial labor and expenditures will not carry the appropriation back by relation to the first substantial act of the appropriator for
its acquisition.-Judgmentaffirmed.
DIVORCE-ENTRY OF DECREE NUNC PRO TUNG-UNDER WHAT
CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH DECREE CAN BE ENTERED-Perdew vs.

Perdew-No. 14045-Decided December 31, 1936-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
In 1921, Alfreada Perdew sued for divorce in the District Court
and on February 9, 1921, finding of fact and conclusions of law were
entered but no decree of divorce was later entered, and in 1936, she filed
a petition for entry of decree nunc pro tunc as of August 10, 1921.
She had since remarried one Fifer and brought suit for separate maintenance and he defended on ground there was no marriage and objects
to the entry of a decree of divorce in the Perdew case, as he would
thereby lose his defense in the separate maintenance action. The latter
had lived together for 11 years, both believing that a divorce had been
granted, and Fifer in applying for the marriage license reciting such
alleged divorce. Perdew also had remarried and had a child as the
result of such latter marriage. The court below refused to enter the
decree.
1. Where it appears that the plaintiff in the divorce action had
requested her attorney, in August, 1921, to have the decree entered and
she was informed that he had done so, and the attorney has since deceased; that she enquired of the clerk of the court and was informed
that a decree had been entered and the clerk has since deceased and that
the trial judge also since deceased, she presented the best evidence available and this was sufficient to warrant the entry of such decree nunc
pro tunc.
2. The general rule is that judgments will be entered nunc pro
tunc only where they have actually been rendered and the entry omitted,
but there are exceptions to this rule.
3. Such decree can be entered in the interest of justice where the
delay was the result of mutual misunderstanding.
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4. While such nunc pro tunc will not be entered where the rights
of third persons are adversely affected, yet in this case, Fifer will only
be affected as to his right to defend the separate maintenance suit, while
on the other hand he will be relieved of the stigma of bigamy by the
entry thereof.
5. The entry of such judgment was within the discretion of the
court and Fifer was no innocent person who would be adversely affected by it and the interests of the state and justice require such entry
and it was error of the trial court to refuse entry.---udgment reversed
with directions to enter decree of divorce, nunc pro tunc.

PHOTOGRAPHS-RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN-WRONGFUL EXPOSURE OF
TO THE PUBLIC-IMPLIED CONTRACT NOT TO EXHIBIT-EXPRESS CONTRACT-McCreery vs. Miller's Groceteria Company

et at.-No. 13636-Decided December 24, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Butler.
Dorothy McCreery sought an injunction and damages against defendants on the ground that one of the defendants, a photographer who
had taken her picture, exposed her picture to public view without her
consent, whereupon she purchased such copy and informed him that
she did not desire her photograph exposed to public view and refused
permission to expose it, and thereafter that the photographer entered
into an agreement with the other defendants whereby such photograph
was to be exposed) in public places without her consent, to her humiliation, distress and damage. The photograph was thereafter exposed and
used in an advertising scheme. General demurrers to the complaint
were sustained and the suit dismissed.
1. A complaint to be bad on a general demurrer must be wholly
insufficient to present facts sufficient to justify a recovery.
2. When the plaintiff employed the photographer to take her
photograph, an implied contrac arose that the photographer would not
make a commercial use of plaintiff's picture.
3. Such unauthorized use would constitute an invasion of a person's right to privacy.
4. Recovery is generally permitted in such case and it usually
rests on the contractual relations between the parties, there being an implied contract to make no additional copies for such use.
5. However, here, the plaintiff after exposure of a copy, purchased such exposed copy and notified the photographer not to display
or use it for advertising, so that there was an express contract that her
picture would not be so used. Here there was not a mere passive breach,
but an intentional breach without any legal justification or excuse.
6. The complaint states a cause of action.--Judgrrentreversed.
Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Holland
dissent.
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